

In a world shaped by geopolitical fragmentation and intensifying competition for technological leadership, critical raw materials have emerged as a strategic asset class. The exponential growth of battery technologies, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing is driving a structural surge in demand, forcing governments and investors to secure control not only over resources, but also across entire supply chains. As a result, critical raw materials are now at the core of global economic and security policy.
European continent is in the state of war during last 4 years. Where Ukraine was heavily supported and recognized by EU partners as an indivisible and inevitable strategic partner with respect to all means. Ukraine’s economic resurrection is increasingly becoming one of the largest and most consequential capital allocation themes in Europe. What began as an emergency response to wartime destruction is now evolving into a much broader investment story, one that involves governments, development banks, private equity firms, infrastructure funds, strategic corporates, and industrial investors all assessing where and how to participate in the country’s long-term recovery. The scale alone explains why attention is rising: the latest rapid assessment by the World Bank and its partners shows that Ukraine’s recovery needs remain vast, while the financing gap for priority recovery spending continues to require substantial external and private-sector participation. At the same time, Ukraine Recovery Conference platforms have increasingly emphasized not only aid, but also the mobilization of private capital across business, energy, infrastructure, logistics, industry, and technology.
Yet one major issue remains unresolved for many international investors: where exactly should long-term capital go? Which industries are sustainable and capable to generate competitive returns? Infrastructure, real estate, transport, renewable energy, industrial modernization, agrifood, IT and defense-tech all form part of the reconstruction landscape. These sectors matter, and many are already featured prominently in official recovery frameworks. But not all of them offer the same combination of scale, export potential, strategic relevance, and long-duration value creation. In that sense, the reconstruction debate is gradually shifting from a question of rebuilding damaged assets toward a deeper question of which industries can become the economic pillars of a stronger Ukrainian state together with its integration with global economy and Western Allies. That distinction is crucial for foreign investors, because the most attractive reconstruction themes are not necessarily the most visible ones.
This is where critical raw materials enter the conversation. The global economy entered the period of structurally higher demand for minerals that underpin batteries, power grids, semiconductors, aerospace, defense systems, and clean-energy technologies. The European Union has already codified this challenge in the Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims by 2030 to ensure that at least 10% of the EU’s annual consumption of strategic raw materials is extracted domestically, 40% is processed domestically, and 25% is recycled, while reducing excessive reliance on any single external supplier. The policy logic is straightforward: critical raw materials are no longer just an industrial issue, but a matter of economic security, technological sovereignty, and defense resilience.
The United States is moving in the same direction. Washington has been strengthening its critical minerals agenda through measures aimed at reducing import dependence, expanding mineral production, and securing more resilient supply chains. U.S. policy language now explicitly links critical minerals to national security, industrial competitiveness, and the need to reduce exposure to concentrated foreign supply. That strategic orientation is now intersecting directly with Ukraine policy as well. In 2025, the United States and Ukraine established the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, creating a framework intended to channel investment into Ukraine’s future economic recovery, including projects tied to natural-resource development. The fund is important not only because of its capital potential, but because it signals a broader shift: Ukraine is increasingly being viewed not simply as a recipient of reconstruction aid, but as a strategic resource partner.
Ukraine stands out as an obvious candidate to become a cornerstone of Western critical raw materials security. Few countries on Europe’s doorstep combine such a large mineral base, industrial heritage, engineering capacity, skillful workforce, geological knowledge, and geopolitical alignment with the EU and the United States. If reconstruction is to be more than a donor-led rebuilding exercise, it must be anchored in sectors that can generate exports, attract strategic capital, and integrate Ukraine into future supply chains. Critical raw materials fit that requirement unusually well. They sit at the intersection of reconstruction, industrial policy, energy transition, and security policy. For that reason, Ukraine should increasingly be viewed not merely as a post-war recovery case, but as a potential strategic superpower in the reshaping of transatlantic critical raw materials supply chains security.
Critical Raw Materials: Ukraine’s Most Strategic Investment Platform
If reconstruction is to generate lasting economic power rather than simply rebuild damaged assets, then Ukraine needs sectors that combine export potential, strategic relevance, and the ability to attract large-scale private capital. Critical raw materials sit at the center of that logic. They connect Ukraine’s reconstruction story not only to European industrial recovery, but to the restructuring of Western supply chains in batteries, aerospace, defense, electronics, and nuclear energy.
The Geological Survey of Ukraine positions the country as one of the most significant undeveloped critical raw materials platforms in Europe. Ukraine holds 22 of the 50 materials identified by the United States as critical and 25 of the 34 recognized by the European Union as critical, with especially strong positions in graphite, lithium, titanium, beryllium, uranium.
For institutional investors and industrial partners, Ukraine represents a high-scale strategic opportunity, consistently ranking among the top three European nations for aggregate Critical Raw Material (CRM) resources. The Geological Survey’s data confirms that Ukraine controls roughly 6% of the world’s graphite reserves, 1–2% of global lithium, and 2–4% of global uranium and many more, the list is endless. This dominance extends to the titanium sector, where Ukraine holds the largest reserves in Europe—potentially accounting for up to 20% of the world’s total resource base—positioning it as the primary alternative to de-risk Western aerospace and defense supply chains.
Geological Survey frames Ukraine not as a single-project story, but as a broad investment universe: around 100 projects across roughly ten critical raw material groups are presented as capable of helping bridge Europe’s and US’ mining gap. That project pipeline includes both brownfield and greenfield opportunities, with 25 licensed greenfield projects, 9 licensed brownfield projects, more than 50 unlicensed greenfield projects, and 11 unlicensed brownfield projects already identified in the state’s opportunity set.
In reality, the overall number of opportunities could be quantified by hundreds, as absolute majority or projects were discovered and characterized during soviet era, where modern exploration techniques where never used, and thresholds for economic feasibility and commercialization were defined with respect to 50-years old recovery technologies. Nowadays, Ukraine’ geological uniqueness serves as world-class super power to be integrated into global CRM supply chains.
Recent acquisitions of bankable projects. For investors, however, resources alone do not create bankable projects. The real question is which of these opportunities can be turned into investable assets, and on what timeline. This is where the Ukrainian case becomes unusually interesting. A number of assets are already being packaged not simply as geological occurrences, but as projects with de-risked subsurface, audited reserves, defined development roadmap, existing infrastructure and even established production. A few bankable projects already found new owners during 2024-2026. Some say that the landscape of the Ukrainian titanium industry has undergone a fundamental shift due to the recent landmark international acquisitions that signal the kick off deep integration into transatlantic supply chains.
The most significant state-level deal involves the privatization of the United Mining and Chemical Company. In late 2024, the Azerbaijan-based investment group NEQSOL Holding, finalized the purchase of the enterprise for approximately 90 mln USD. This acquisition includes the Irshansk and Vilnohirsk mining and processing complexes, which together represent one of the largest sources of titanium raw materials in Europe. The investor has committed to a substantial modernization program with a strategic focus on transitioning the operations from a raw-ore export model toward deep metallurgical processing to produce high-value titanium products.
In the private sector, the Australian-listed company European Lithium Limited completed a strategic merger with Velta Holding in early 2026. This transaction, valued at approximately 124 mln USD (173 million Australian dollars in shares), gives the combined entity control over major ilmenite deposits in the Kirovohrad region, including the Birzulivske and Likarivske fields. These assets represent about 2 percent of the global market for titanium raw materials.
These transactions collectively send a clear signal: international capital is ready to enter Ukraine, even under current wartime conditions. What matters most is not the absence of risk, but the presence of clear, transparent, and bankable assets — projects with defined ownership structures, audited resource bases, and credible development pathways. Where such conditions exist – capital will follow.
At the same time, these deals represent only a small fraction of the broader opportunity set. Ukraine already hosts hundreds of brownfield and greenfield projects identified by the state and industry, many of which remain underdeveloped not due to lack of resources, but due to insufficient preparation. The next phase of value creation lies in systematic de-risking: subsurface validation, resource auditing to international standards, pilot testing, and feasibility studies. Converting these assets into investment-ready opportunities will unlock a pipeline of world-class projects capable of attracting large-scale international capital valued at billions and anchoring Ukraine’s position in global critical raw materials supply chains.
De-risking of Assets and Opportunities.
All of that said, the most important investor takeaway is not that Ukraine already has a fully audited mining portfolio ready for project finance. It does not. Many of the opportunities presented by the Geological Survey are better understood as non-audited or partially matured opportunities: strong geological concepts, resources, state-backed promotional materials, and in some cases real operator presence — but often without the full stack of modern bankability elements that international capital would normally require. In other words, Ukraine’s CRM portfolio is rich in opportunity but still short on systematic de-risking.
That is precisely why this segment is so compelling. The next wave of value creation in Ukraine’s critical minerals universe will not come only from acquiring producing assets. It will come from de-risking. For many deposits, the key missing steps are well understood: updated resource definition to international standards, modern metallurgical test work, mine planning, pilot processing, environmental and social baseline studies, logistics validation, and clarity on downstream processing pathways. In practical investor terms, this means that some of the highest-return cases in Ukraine may not be late-stage mature acquisitions, but early to be appraised and de-risked greenfields that convert geologically attractive, pre-identified opportunities into financeable projects.
This opens several routes for foreign capital to participate in Ukrainian CRM developments. The first one is simple acquisition of assets/opportunities with all permits and legal rights, second one – direct participation in joint ventures with local partner holding license for subsoil use, especially where deposits already have a private operator but require technical, financial, or downstream partners. Third scenario, to capture the most of the value from opportunities – is to JV with local partners and to grab greenfield opportunities, to de-risk them and to convert into bankable projects with further development. A de-risking model built around staged capital: first for technical validation, then for pilot or feasibility work, and only later for full mine and plant development. This staged approach is especially relevant in Ukraine because a substantial part of the opportunity set still sits in the zone between geological promise and institutional-grade project readiness.
It should be viewed as the investment mantra. In more mature jurisdictions, most of the de-risking has already been done and much of the value has already been captured. In Ukraine, by contrast, a significant share of the value uplift still lies ahead. For the right investors, that creates the possibility to enter before global competition fully prices in the country’s strategic role in European and transatlantic critical raw materials security.
Critical Minerals from Subsurface Brines: From Niche to the Most Emerging Mining Industry
While most discussions around critical raw materials globally is still focus on traditional hard-rock mining, a parallel industry is rapidly emerging around the globe – the extraction of valuable elements from subsurface brines. Over the past decade, this segment has evolved from a niche chemical activity into a global industry, supported by technological advances and strong policy alignment in both Europe and the United States.
Most of global developments around this industry are targeting lithium development, where defining feature of the global lithium market is its geographic concentration. A significant share of lithium resources and production is located in the Americas —particularly in Chile and Argentina — creating structural dependence for US, Europe and other industrial regions. At the same time, rapid growth in battery technologies, electric vehicles, energy storage, and AI-related infrastructure is driving a sharp increase in demand. As a result, governments and industrial players are actively seeking to diversify supply chains and secure domestic or allied sources of lithium and other critical raw materials.
Within this context, Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) has emerged as a key enabling technology. Unlike traditional evaporation methods, DLE allows lithium to be extracted directly from subsurface brines — geothermal fluids and oilfield formation waters —through selective adsorption or membrane-based processes. This reduces processing time from years to days and unlocks previously uneconomic resources.
In the United States, DLE is already scaling at high pace. In Arkansas, the Smackover Formation is being developed by companies such as ExxonMobil and Standard Lithium, targeting 20–30 kt of lithium carbonate (LCE) per year per module with basin-scale potential exceeding 100 kt annually. In California, the Salton Sea geothermal system is advancing integrated projects targeting 25–75 kt LCE per year, forming the basis of a domestic “Lithium Valley.”
Europe is demonstrating tangible progress in Direct Lithium Extraction, particularly companies such as Lithium de France and Vulcan Energy Resources are advancing geothermal brine projects targeting 20–40 thousand tonnes LCE per year, combining lithium extraction with renewable geothermal energy production. At the same time, upstream players including Neptune Energy have demonstrated that oilfield formation waters can contain economically relevant lithium concentrations, highlighting the potential to leverage existing hydrocarbon infrastructure for lower-cost development. This model is rapidly scaling globally.
As global lithium demand grows toward 2.5–3.0 million tonnes LCE (Lithium Carbonate Equivalent) by 2030, DLE and brine-based systems are expected to supply 20–30% of new production, establishing a new industrial segment capable of delivering 500–800 thousand tonnes annually.
These examples illustrate a broader trend. Brine-based extraction is no longer a marginal secondary segment — it is becoming a core contributor to future supply.
The capital required to build this capacity is substantial. Global investment needs for lithium supply expansion are estimated in the range of $150–250 billion by 2030, with a meaningful share directed toward brine-based projects. Individual developments typically follow a modular pathway: pilot and demonstration phases requiring $5–20 million, followed by initial commercial modules of $100–8000 million, and ultimately large-scale integrated systems exceeding $1–2 billion in total capital expenditure. This staged approach allows investors to progressively de-risk projects while maintaining flexibility in capital deployment.
Ukraine has extensive list of competitive advantages – established oil and gas sectors, extensive subsurface data repositories, 10000+ idle wells all around the country to be used for pilot projects, this model offers a particularly attractive pathway. It enables the transformation of existing idle assets into multi-commodity resource systems, where hydrocarbons, geothermal energy, and critical minerals can be developed in parallel.
In this context, the global experience provides a clear signal:
brine-based extraction is not a future concept, but a rapidly scaling segment of the critical raw materials industry, with the potential to play a decisive role in meeting supply gaps over the coming decade.
Biomining from Tailings and Industrial Waste: Ukraine’s Untapped Resource Layer Sitting on the Ground
Beyond primary extraction, one of the most underutilized sources of critical raw materials globally lies in mine tailings and industrial waste streams. In Ukraine, this opportunity is particularly pronounced. Decades of intensive mining, metallurgy, and heavy industry have generated hundreds of millions to billions of tonnes of tailings and processing residues, much of which was produced under historical recovery thresholds that typically left 20–50% of valuable elements unrecovered. As global demand for critical raw materials is expected to increase several-fold by 2030, these legacy materials represent a significant, already-mined resource base.
Ukraine’s industrial legacy, spanning iron ore, titanium, uranium, coal, and ferroalloy production, has resulted in a vast network of tailings storage facilities and industrial waste accumulations. Many of these materials are now understood to contain residual concentrations of rare earth elements (REE), scandium, vanadium, cesium and many other critical raw materials, often in ranges of hundreds of grams to kilograms per tonne for REE and associated elements. In practical terms, this means that Ukraine holds a large-scale above-ground resource base that can be accessed without additional mining, reducing both capital intensity and development timelines.
This creates a fundamentally different investment proposition. Unlike greenfield mining projects, which typically require $500 million to $1.5 billion in upfront capital and long development cycles, tailings-based recovery projects can often be initiated through pilot-scale investments in the range of $5–10 million, with full-scale facilities generally requiring $25–100 million depending on scale and processing complexity. The primary constraint historically has been technological, as conventional methods struggle with low-grade and chemically complex materials.
However, advances in biomining technologies are beginning to unlock this value. By utilizing controlled biological processes to selectively extract metals, these systems can achieve recovery rates of 60–90% for certain elements, while operating at lower energy intensity and with minimal environmental footprint compared to traditional methods.
For Ukraine, this represents a third pillar of critical raw materials development, alongside hard-rock mining and brine extraction. It enables the country not only to develop new resources, but to reprocess its industrial past into future supply, effectively transforming environmental liabilities into strategic assets. In the context of reconstruction and integration into global supply chains, biomining offers a scalable and capital-efficient pathway to unlock additional resource potential while aligning with ESG and circular economy objectives.
References
1. European Commission. Critical Raw Materials Act and related strategic raw materials policy papers. Brussels, 2023–2026. https://commission.europa.eu/
2. World Bank, European Commission, United Nations, Government of Ukraine. Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA). 2024–2025.
3. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Ukraine Recovery and Investment Programmes. 2022–2026. https://www.ebrd.com/
4. U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Mineral Commodity Summaries: Lithium, Rare Earths, Graphite, Titanium, Uranium. Annual editions 2023–2026. https://www.usgs.gov/
5. U.S. Department of Energy. Critical Minerals and Battery Supply Chain Strategy. Washington DC, 2023–2025.
6. State Service of Geology and Subsoil of Ukraine (Derzhgeonadra). Official investment materials, subsoil permits registry, and strategic minerals opportunities in Ukraine. Kyiv, 2024–2026. https://www.geo.gov.ua/
7. Geological Survey of Ukraine. Presentation materials on Ukraine’s Critical Raw Materials portfolio, project pipeline, reserves and licensed opportunities.
8. State Property Fund of Ukraine; NEQSOL Holding. Privatization and acquisition of United Mining and Chemical Company (UMCC), including Irshansk and Vilnohirsk mining complexes. Kyiv / corporate releases, 2024.
9. European Lithium Limited (ASX announcements). Merger / strategic transaction with Velta Holding, including titanium assets in Kirovohrad region. 2026.
10. Velta Holding. Corporate materials on titanium mining, titanium powders, alloys and vertically integrated strategy in Ukraine. 2024–2026.
11. Vulcan Energy Resources; Lithium de France; Standard Lithium; ExxonMobil; Controlled Thermal Resources. Corporate presentations and public disclosures on Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE), geothermal lithium and brine projects in Europe and the United States. 2022–2026.
12. International Energy Agency (IEA). Global Critical Minerals Outlook and The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions. Paris, 2022–2025.
13. European Commission / EIT RawMaterials / academic literature. Mining waste, tailings reprocessing, biomining, circular raw materials recovery, and rare earth extraction from industrial residues. 2022–2025.






