Switzerland Votes on Easing Arms Exports. Ukraine Stays Excluded.

Law News Digest: Defence, Neutrality & Trade · Longread

On 29 November 2026, Swiss voters will decide whether to loosen the rules for exporting war material. The amendment to the War Material Act would allow Swiss companies to supply 36 partner states even when they are involved in an armed conflict, and would end the systematic requirement that buyers promise never to pass Swiss weapons on. It was born out of the debate over Ukraine. Yet, in its final form, it explicitly does not open the door to Ukraine.

For Ukrainian readers, this vote raises a sharp question: why would Switzerland make it easier to sell arms to dozens of countries — while keeping the country defending itself against Russia outside the circle? This analysis explains what changes, why Ukraine remains excluded, where a narrow door stays ajar, and what it means for Ukrainian companies working with European and Swiss partners.

Key takeaways

Vote on 29 November 2026. Parliament passed the amendment in December 2025; a referendum led by the SP, the Greens and peace organisations forced a national vote.
CHF 948.2 million in exports in 2025. Swiss war material exports rose almost 43% year on year, close to the 2022 record. 86% went to European countries.
36 partner states benefit. EU and EFTA members, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Argentina could receive Swiss material even while involved in an armed conflict.
Ukraine remains excluded. According to the Federal Council, direct and indirect deliveries to Ukraine stay prohibited under neutrality law.
A door stays ajar. If a European state credibly buys material for its own armed forces, no non-re-export declaration is required — and a later transfer to Ukraine becomes factually possible.
The outcome is open. The first SRG poll shows 49% in favour, 41% against and 10% undecided.

The numbers behind the debate

Switzerland is a small but significant arms exporter. According to SECO, Swiss companies exported war material worth CHF 948.2 million in 2025, up from CHF 664.7 million in 2024 — an increase of almost 43%. Deliveries went to 64 countries. Germany was by far the largest buyer with CHF 386.4 million, followed by the United States (CHF 94.2 million), Hungary (CHF 63.4 million), Italy (CHF 62.2 million) and Luxembourg (CHF 47.4 million). More than 86% of exports went to Europe.

Supporters of the amendment see these figures as proof that Swiss industry is part of Europe’s rearmament and must stay in its supply chains. Opponents read the same numbers the other way: an industry growing this fast, they argue, does not need weaker rules.

How Ukraine shaped — and lost — the reform

The reform started as a response to Ukraine. In 2022 and 2023, Switzerland refused requests from Germany, Denmark and Spain to pass Swiss-made material on to Ukraine. The most prominent case concerned ammunition for German Gepard anti-aircraft tanks. Each refusal was based on the non-re-export declarations that Swiss law required from buyers, and on Swiss neutrality.

For about three years, Parliament searched for a formula that would allow such transfers. It did not find one. A proposal to exempt states exercising self-defence under the UN Charter failed. In the end, a majority of the Swiss People’s Party, the FDP and the Centre agreed on a broader loosening that helps the industry but leaves Ukraine out. Economy minister Guy Parmelin confirmed in Parliament that Ukraine would not benefit. Opponents now call the law a “Lex Rüstungsindustrie” rather than a “Lex Ukraine”. Even some supporters are uneasy: Centre politician Marianne Binder voted yes, but said that the country that most needs help is the one being left out.

On 19 December 2025, the National Council approved the amendment by 122 votes to 68 (6 abstentions), and the Council of States by 31 to 11 (1 abstention). The referendum was filed on 17 April 2026. The vote was scheduled after the neutrality initiative, which Swiss voters clearly rejected on 28 September 2026.

What exactly changes

Question	Under the amended War Material Act
36 partner states (EU, EFTA, US, UK, Japan and others) at war	Exports possible, if compatible with neutrality and Swiss interests
Non-re-export declarations	No longer systematic; required only where foreign, neutrality or security policy calls for it
Federal Council exceptions	Possible in extraordinary circumstances to protect Swiss interests
Direct exports to Ukraine	Still prohibited
Re-export to Ukraine	Blocked where SECO sees a high risk; old declarations stay valid
Material bought by a European state “for own use”	No declaration required — a later transfer to Ukraine becomes factually possible

Three mechanisms matter. First, the 36 partner states listed in Annex 2 of the War Material Ordinance could receive Swiss material even while involved in an armed conflict, as long as this is compatible with neutrality and Swiss foreign and security policy. Second, buyers would no longer automatically have to sign a non-re-export declaration; Switzerland would request one only when foreign, neutrality or security policy reasons require it. Third, the Federal Council would gain the power to deviate from the licensing criteria in extraordinary circumstances to protect Swiss interests.

The Federal Council has given a concrete example of why it wants this flexibility: since the escalation of the conflict between the United States and Iran on 28 February 2026, no new definitive export licence to the United States has been approved. Under the amendment, licences for items without military relevance to that conflict — such as components integrated into systems ordered by European countries — could again be granted.

Why Ukraine stays outside

The legal answer is neutrality. Under the law of neutrality, Switzerland must treat parties to an international armed conflict equally. Because it applies an embargo on war material against Russia, it cannot at the same time supply Ukraine with material that would give it a military advantage. The Federal Council is explicit: its new power to make exceptions cannot be used for the war in Ukraine, because neutrality law applies in full.

Switzerland’s neutrality treats the attacker and the attacked the same way when it comes to weapons. That is the core of the Ukrainian frustration.

The door left ajar

There is, however, an important nuance in SECO’s own explanation. Non-re-export declarations will no longer be requested systematically. If SECO sees a high risk that material will reach Ukraine directly, it will require a declaration — and reject the application if the risk remains too high. But if a European buyer credibly states that the material is for its own armed forces, no declaration is required. A later decision by that country to pass the material on to Ukraine would then, in SECO’s words, be factually possible.

In other words, the amendment does not allow Switzerland to send weapons to Ukraine — but it may reduce Switzerland’s ability to stop European states from doing so later with material they bought for themselves. Declarations already signed for previously delivered material, including the cases that blocked transfers in 2022 and 2023, remain valid.

The arguments on both sides

Supporters: Federal Council, Parliament, SVP, FDP, Centre, GLP, business associations

Security: neutrality requires credible self-defence, and that requires a domestic defence industry.
Competitiveness: strict rules push Swiss firms out of European supply chains, costing jobs and know-how.
Leverage: as Switzerland is not part of any alliance, being a reliable supplier strengthens its position in a crisis. As the Federal Council puts it: “Those who have nothing to offer cannot demand anything either.”

Opponents: SP, Greens, peace and aid organisations, church groups

Control: without systematic re-export declarations, Switzerland would largely lose control over where its weapons end up.
Human rights: Swiss material could more easily reach states involved in wars or systematic human rights violations.
Credibility: the change could weaken Switzerland’s role as a neutral mediator — and break the 2021 political compromise that led to stricter rules.
Ukraine: critics point out that a reform sold with Ukraine in mind ends up helping everyone except Ukraine.

The first SRG trend poll by GFS Bern, conducted 5–18 October, shows 49% yes, 41% no and 10% undecided, with a margin of error of ±2.8 points. Support is stronger in German-speaking Switzerland, opposition stronger in the French-speaking part. The strongest pro argument is industry competitiveness (67% agree); the strongest contra argument is the risk of weapons reaching human rights violators (68% agree). On neutrality, voters are split 47 to 47.

What it means for Ukrainian business

For most Ukrainian companies, the vote changes little in their day-to-day cooperation with Switzerland: reconstruction, energy, infrastructure and civilian trade are not affected. For companies in the defence and security sector — and for those supplying European defence manufacturers — the details matter.

Swiss companies cannot be your direct supplier of war material. That remains true whatever the outcome of the vote.
European supply chains are the real channel. Ukrainian companies cooperating with European defence manufacturers should know whether systems include Swiss components and which declarations apply to them — this can decide whether a joint project can deliver to Ukraine.
Contracts must anticipate export-control risk. Clauses on export licences, end-use, re-export and change of law should be negotiated at the start, not after a shipment is blocked.
Dual-use goods follow separate rules. Goods that can serve both civilian and military purposes fall under a different Swiss export-control regime and need a separate legal check.
Watch the implementation. If voters approve the amendment, the Federal Council will set the date of entry into force and SECO’s licensing practice will show how the “own use” rule works in reality.

What to watch next

29 November: the vote itself. A no keeps the current, stricter rules in place; a yes opens the new framework for 36 partner states.
SECO practice: how strictly SECO will assess the risk of transfers to Ukraine, and how “own use” will be verified.
European reaction: whether Germany and other buyers, who were frustrated by earlier refusals, see Swiss suppliers as reliable again.

The bottom line

Switzerland is about to decide how open its arms industry should be to a Europe that is rearming because of Russia’s war. Whatever voters choose, Ukraine will not be a direct customer. For Ukrainian businesses and policymakers, the more useful question is not whether Switzerland will change its neutrality, but how Swiss components, European partners and well-drafted contracts can work within the rules that exist.

Lighthouse: your Swiss desk

Lighthouse follows Swiss law and policy that affect Ukraine — from reconstruction funding to export controls — and explains it for Ukrainian businesses. If your company works with Swiss or European partners in defence, security or dual-use technologies, we help you understand the export-control framework and draft contracts that hold when the rules change.

Contact us: info@lighthouse-legal.eu